Systematic Sectarian Campaigns Put Lebanese Displaced by the Israeli War at Risk

“We don’t rent to women who wear hijab, and you’d be better off looking for somewhere a long way from here.” Zahra never expected to receive such a response when she went looking somewhere safe to stay. This young woman from southern Lebanon had been forced to leave home in Nabatieh with her family at dawn on 2 March 2026 following Israeli airstrikes across the country.

For Zahra and many Lebanese like her, the renewed war came as no surprise. For months they had been living under the strain of continuous Israeli violations of the ceasefire agreement, brokered internationally in late November 2024. The southern front had become active on 8 October 2023, in what became known as the "support front” for Gaza. Confrontations then escalated during 2024 into a comprehensive Israeli ground and air campaign, which caused heavy casualties and material losses and widespread displacement.

After being stuck in traffic for hours with thousands of other displaced people, Zahra reached the Abra neighborhood near Sidon, where her family stayed temporarily in her aunt’s house. Looking for housing large enough for her family, she contacted a landlord who had advertised apartments for rent on social media. But instead of answering her questions about the apartment, he began questioning her about which sect she belonged, whether she wore a hijab, and what her political affiliations were. He said finally: “We don’t rent to women who wear hijab. You know, we’re mainly Christians here, and we don’t want the hijab getting in here. You’re Shia, and we’re scared you might be a target, and then our lives and those of others here will be at risk.”

It was a similar story in Kaifoun, a town near Aley in the Mount Lebanon Governorate, where Mariam – a university student from the town of Tallouseh in the Marjayoun district of southern Lebanon – had taken refuge with her family in a small basement in a house for the duration of the war. But the short-lived sense of safety was shattered when a nearby building was shelled.

In the middle of the night, Mariam and her family were asked to leave the basement quickly, as the owners of the building next door feared having displaced people there might make their building a target. They packed up their things and set off into the unknown. But then one of the family managed to use contacts at the local council, which meant they could go back to the basement with an official guarantee. This agreement, however, meant their daily life was restricted. They were not allowed to wear abayas or have visitors. And such was the level of mistrust that anyone who came to see the family was questioned.

Traumatic displacement was just the start of more suffering, which the displaced faced throughout their months of exile. Zahra’s and Mariam’s stories mirror those of thousands of others who fled the war in search of safety, only to find themselves confronting another war that was no less brutal, one that continued to haunt them even after they had left the battlefield behind.

Within a month of the war starting, over a million people had been displaced, according to the daily reports put out by the Disaster Risk Management Unit. They had fled from southern Lebanon, from the southern suburbs of Beirut, and also the western and northern Bekaa. Of these, 136,000 ended up in state-run shelters, but most went to the homes of relatives in different parts of the country, or rented housing. It was this last group who were most often the target of online disinformation campaigns.

After 2 March 2026 scenes of an exodus from southern Lebanon returned

Our investigation tracked all posts about displaced people made from February to July 2026. We analyzed selected posts on X (formerly Twitter) targeting the displaced on a sectarian basis, using the term “Shi’a displaced persons”. These posts were linked to several hashtags, including “Iran_proxy_war”, “Hezbollah_terrorist”, ‘MLGA’, “Hezbollah” and, in particular, “Lebanon”. In the second week of the war there was an upsurge in the number of posts. Most of them—33.5 percent—were from accounts based in Lebanon, followed by Saudi Arabia and then the US.

The language in these posts can be described as sectarian hate speech, because it incites discrimination against the displaced based on their religious affiliation, harming them directly, even if there is no explicit call for murder or physical violence.

The UN defines hate speech as: “communication that attacks or uses derogatory or discriminatory language to refer to a person or group on the basis of their identity; in other words, on the basis of their religion, race, nationality, ethnicity, skin color, descent, gender or any other element of their identity”.

The posts we analyzed for the most part rejected the idea of accepting displaced people and called for them to be deported by sea to Cyprus. They promoted claims that these people were a security risk and a demographic threat, particularly in predominantly Christian areas, sometimes evoking memories of the Lebanese civil war. Posts also included visual and written material alleging that displaced people had vandalized public property or used it to store weapons, in a bid to tarnish their image and turn public opinion against them.

On May 14, 2024, former Secretary-General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah, who was subsequently assassinated in an Israeli airstrike, called on the Lebanese authorities to allow Syrian refugees who were willing to leave Lebanon voluntarily to embark for Europe from Lebanese ports. He was critical of the ban on them emigrating, saying: “Let us resolve as a nation to say: ‘Dear Syrian brothers who have been displaced, whoever wishes to leave for Europe or Cyprus, the sea is before you; so take to the boats and set sail.’”

Nasrallah’s statement came at a time when the EU and the US were under pressure to help repatriate Syrian refugees and provide them with help once they returned.

While monitoring content posted online, we noticed that an account with the name “Bilal_D75” had the idea of using Nasrallah’s speech and reposting it in a different context—to target the Shia community: “Any of you Shia refugees from the south who wants to leave for Europe or Cyprus, the sea is before you, so make that your ship and set sail.” This was accompanied by offensive remarks like: “To hell with you and anyone who feels sorry for you.”

Research showed that the Bilal_D75 account belongs to someone called “Abu Majd”, who lives in Lebanon and has changed his profile nine times. He previously wrote that he was “a supporter of the rights of the Syrian people until my last breath”, also describing his account as an “online troll”.

Original post by Bilal_D75 on 31 May

Bilal_D75 was also the most influential account we found, generating 1,300 interactions on X, with a reach of 101,000. Results showed that 84 posts used the exact same wording. Most of these were in late May and mid-June. The peak was in mid-June and coincided with the intensification of Israeli evacuation warnings in southern Lebanon during the first ten days of that month.

Nasrallah’s original language was therefore repurposed as evacuation warnings intensified, triggering large waves of displacement. This also coincided with displaced people being placed in reception centers—134,534 of them on 10 June 2026, according to the Disaster Risk Management Unit.

Figures show that the Bilal_D75 account was among the most influential In the campaign against displaced people in Lebanon

The results showed that more than ten accounts reposted content verbatim from Bilal_D75, citing it as the original source. The posts were made close together in two specific phases. The first began on 31 May 2026, when the Muawiyah87 account reposted the content at 16:49 that afternoon, followed by two other accounts—MNM20053 and JusticeEyesss from Saudi Arabia—at 16:58. Further reposts followed at 17:44, 18:24, 20:27, 20:30, 20:34, 20:44 and 20:50 via other accounts.

Accounts that reposted the Bilal_D75 account content during the first wave

A second wave of posts began appearing at 00:03 on 2 June, with reposts at 00:34 and 00:40. They began again at 05:34, continuing on other accounts through the morning at 09:05, 09:59, 10:04, 10:29 and 11:23 until 14:32.

Accounts that reposted and circulated the Bilal_D75 post

This data shows that there was a coordinated, inflammatory mass mobilization campaign, originating from the Bilal_D75 account. This is evident from the matching wording, its reposting by several accounts within a short period, and the fact that posts came in two separate waves. The Bilal_D75 account was also prominent as a hub for circulating these posts, and its content was predominantly negative.

On 22 March, there was an outcry against opening a shelter for the displaced in Karantina, which turned out to be one of the clearest examples of the use of inflammatory tactics and hate speech.

During this controversy over the establishment of this shelter in the Karantina area, next to the Port of Beirut, journalist and political analyst Joseph Abu Fadel said in an interview on Al Jadeed TV, that housing displaced people in predominantly Christian areas “poses a danger”, claiming that they were infiltrated by Hezbollah fighters. He also said their presence in Karantina posed demographic risks and could exacerbate tension, which, he said, could spark civil war.

He reposted what he said in a tweet on 22 March, which received over 170,000 views and 1,016 interactions, and was retweeted by 107 other accounts.

Similar language was echoed by ministers, MPs and media figures , including a former minister for social affairs, Richard Kouyoumjian. He not only rejected the idea of accepting displaced people near the port, but went as far as calling their presence a “ticking time bomb” that threatened the Lebanese people’s security and stability.

Tweet by Former Minister for Social Affairs Richard Kouyoumjian expressing refusal to accept displaced people in Beirut
Click to read transcript

Alongside the demographic threat, there was vocal opposition to taking in displaced people on the grounds that this posed a security threat to host communities. A number of officials took this position over the proposed resettlement of refugees in Karantina, including MP Razi al-Hajj, a member of the Strong Republic Bloc, who tweeted on X: “We won’t accept the Karantina-Port area being turned into a security hotspot under the guise of giving shelter to displaced people.”

Father Hanna Khoury, meanwhile, called in a video message for no displaced persons to be accepted in Christian areas, specifically the “Al-Qalaa and Al-Jadida” districts, and demanded they be evicted from homes, calling the situation “dangerous”.

Lebanese Forces MP Razi al-Hajj appeared on MTV claiming that Hezbollah members had infiltrated the displaced: “Let’s not beat around the bush; there are people with links to Hezbollah with military roles who are living in these areas with their families, and Israel is looking for them.”

Former Lebanese minister May Chidiac said in a television interview: “They’re prepared to be displaced and die a hundred times over. You can’t feel sorry for these people.”

In the same vein, Nabil Boumnsaf, deputy editor-in-chief of An-Nahar, appeared in a video posted on the newspaper’s website saying: “Don’t rent out your apartment; it might get you killed. Keeping apartments and people safe is now the most important thing in this war.” He added: “What the local councils are doing may be a good thing, but it’s not enough. It’s not enough to simply register the names of people who come into your building; you don’t know what’s going on between them. Councils aren’t intelligence agencies.”

Alongside this political rhetoric, a media campaign has sought to defame displaced and portraying them as “aggressors and saboteurs”. The “Huna Lubnan” website published an article entitled: “Displaced people occupy private schools in Beirut, whose owners appeal to the state to intervene”. However, the article in question failed to substantiate any of these claims. Nor did it give the names of the schools allegedly attacked, or the names of the owners.

The Transparency website meanwhile published a misleading video claiming “the seizure of weapons and military equipment from displaced people in the town of Sharon, Aley District”, which was shared by several media outlets before the “Voice of Beirut International” page reposted the video under the headline “Weapons found in a school in Tariq El Jdideh housing displaced people affiliated with Hezbollah”.

The accusation that the displaced pose a threat to the lives of host communities aligns closely with the Israeli narrative – disseminated by the occupation army’s Arabic spokesperson and media platforms – that Hezbollah is using Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure for military purposes.

This narrative alleges that weapons or military infrastructure are being kept inside civilian homes, even in places of worship, and in predominantly Christian towns. Such claims have been used to justify threats to evacuate and target civilian areas, and to reinforce the message that any area hosting displaced people, or with a high population density, could become an Israeli target.

There is no doubt that Israeli strikes on areas where displaced people had sought refuge helped fuel tensions and divisions within society. During the war, there were air raids on places hosting thousands of displaced people, leaving many dead and wounded.

On April 8, 2026, Israel launched around 100 simultaneous airstrikes across Lebanon, including Beirut, home to thousands of displaced people. They left 357 people dead and injured 1,223, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Health.

Dr. Zeina Muhanna, Director of Programs and Partnerships at the Amel Association International, told Manateq.net that “inflammatory language is a result of each political faction’s perspective on the war”, noting that it had manifested itself in the form of confrontations inside shelters and incidents on the roads.

Zeina argued that Israel had sought to exacerbate internal rifts through its attacks, exploiting sectarian divisions dating from Lebanon’s civil war, whose effects persisted.

On June 19, a ceasefire came into effect, after which more than 800,000 people cautiously returned to their homes in the south and the southern suburbs of Beirut, according to the UN.

Zahra returned to the south, which continued to suffer heavily from shelling, but she kept the house in Abra, where she had taken refuge, as an option in case things escalate again. After enduring so much and learning from the experience, Zahra now knows where to seek shelter and which areas might accept her, so that she is not confronted again with a situation no less cruel than being displaced in the first place.

This investigation was produced through a partnership between ARIJ and Manateq.