In January 2010, former Minister of Culture Muhammad Abu Bakir Al-Muflihi announced the launch of a 500 million rials (or $2,272,000) fund for cultural projects, as part of the Ministry's Heritage and Cultural Development Fund. However, to date, none of these projects have been implemented — not even the restoration of the ancient Dar Al-Hamad Palace or any of Sanaa’s antique houses.
This was not the first or last time projects were announced but never seen the light of day. The article related to the restoration of Dar Al-Hamad appeared in the Fund’s budget between 2005 and 2015, and was even at the top of the statements issued by officials praising the completion of dozens of projects classified within the Ministry of Culture’s “achievements”.
However, the Ministry’s declarations are at odd with our conclusions that have proved that the so-called “cultural projects” in fact constitute an opportunity to acquire funds worth millions of dollars.
Funds allocated for projects and other activities are usually transferred to other accounts and they are not added to the following year’s available capital. Instead, the money is spent through various means and on items other than those to which they were allocated originally. This investigation reveals that the capital is usually transferred to some employees at the ministry and their politically loyal cronies.
Yemeni officials from the Ministry of Culture usually attribute the absence of cultural activity to the scarcity of funds. However, this investigation reveals that there are recurring practices that devour billions of rials collected from Yemeni citizens in the name of “supporting cultural development”. The negligence of various supervisory bodies including the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption, the Central Organisation for Control and Auditing, and the ministries of Finance and Civil Service, enables these practices to occur.
Such cultural projects are usually a tool to acquire the capitals allocated and estimated to reach millions of dollars annually.
The Heritage and Cultural Development Fund was established by Law No. 11 of 2002 with the aim of "contributing to cultural development, establishing infrastructure for cultural work and preserving archaeological sites". However, documents obtained by the investigator reveal that public officials seized about 80% of the Fund’s money. This is in conflict with Article 14 of the law, which stipulates that money may not be spent outside the scope of the goals set for it.
Data from the Fund indicates that 90% of the total expenditures of its third budget entry originally designated for cultural activities were transferred as aid and donations for people, most of whom were Ministry of Culture employees. In 2010, 479 million rials ($2,150,000) was allocated to the same expenditure entry in the budget, 429 million ($1,900,000) of which was categorised under “rewards and gifts”. In 2011, the Fund spent 66 million rials ($330,000) in the form of gifts and bonuses, which is double the basic salary according to the Fund’s accounts. These practices occur in a war-torn country which is not only the poorest among Arab states but also ranks 151 from 177 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI).
Between 2003 and 2014, the Fund wasted 99% of its annual budget on “benefits” for its own, and ministry, employees. Meanwhile, only 16,573,560 out of 1,711,251,000 rials that were earmarked for capital projects, were spent on constructing buildings and the purchase of office supplies. This is the equivalent of less than $100,000 out of $8.5 million being spent on Fund-related projects.
Ministers of Culture usually rely on a well-established legal and political system that protects them from legal accountability, except in certain cases. The trial of senior officials of the rank of Deputy Minister or higher is conditional upon a direct decision by the President of the Republic. Alternatively, it could be proposed by one-fifth of the members of the House of Representatives. The proposal then has to be approved by two-thirds of the members according to Article 10 of Law No.6 of 1995 regarding the accusation and trial of those who hold public office at the Supreme executive authority. Moreover, Article 128 of the Yemeni Constitution grants the President of the Republic immunity from prosecution except in three cases: high treason, constitutional breaches or infringement upon the country's independence and sovereignty.
The National Anti-Corruption Strategy reports that the legal articles mentioned above, tops the list of reasons that “corruption continues to dominate and spreads vertically and horizontally”.
Official records show that most of the allocations for capital projects were transformed into rewards. This is in spite of the fact that wages mentioned in the first budget entry constitute 61% of the Ministry of Culture’s total budget and 19% of the Fund’s budget, which is 1,250,000,000 rials ($6 million).
Employees of the Ministry of Culture and its Fund receive 200 million rials ($1 million) annually from the Heritage Fund, which also allocates 111 million rials ($500,000), in the form of bonuses and petty cash for its employees, to the Minister and to his entourage. Payment vouchers show that, in contrast, the support of governmental and private cultural institutions does not exceed 104 million rials ($400,000). These are disbursed to beneficiaries in cash without going through banks.
The Fund management have misappropriated and mixed the budgets’ entries, which is against both the Financial Law and the Executive Regulations of Wages that set overtime compensation and bonuses at between 40% to 80% of the basic salary and make it conditional to cap (the beneficiaries) at only 25% of the total number of employees.
Basic and contractual salaries constitute 13% of the total of the first budget entry with an annual average of 90 million rials ($450,000). In contrast, an analysis of the Fund's financial statements from 2003-2014 by a chartered accountant shows that bonuses form four times the allocated amount, at 370%.
There are years where the Fund's resources increased to more than 700 million rials. In those years, wages, fixed payments and administrative requirements continued to account for 88% of its budget, while the share of activities relevant to the Fund's primary function did not exceed 12%.
Yet, this percentage does not reflect actual Fund activity; for example, the manuscript inventory, restoration and documentation project has been ongoing since 2007, and its estimated cost is 5 million rials ($20,000) per month. Interviews held by the investigator with management and employees at the Fund confirmed that this amount was reallocated to pay wages for unofficial employees in the manuscript library in Sana'a.
The Board of Directors is supposed to be formed according to Article 6 of the Fund Law, and it grants the representatives of the Ministry of Culture the authority to make decisions. However, since its inception, and until the preparation of this investigation, the overall authority remained in the hands of the successive ministers while the Fund remained without a board of directors or regulations.
"It is not in the interest of the Minister to form a board of directors because that would limit his authority," explains Walid Dammaj, who was Executive Director of the Fund for two terms.
Five ministers were in charge of the Ministry of Culture between 2002 until the spring of 2015 when state institutions collapsed against the backdrop of the joint Houthi coup aided by some forces loyal to the previous regime. Those Ministers were Abdul-Wahab Al-Rouhani (2001-2003), Khaled Al-Ruwaishan (2003-2006), Muhammad Abu Bakir Al-Muflihi (2007-2011), Abdulla Obel (2012-2014) and Arwa Othman (November 2014 to January-December 2015).
Dammaj, who worked with Al-Ruwaishan and Obel, stated that: “We would usually inform the Minister that the orders he issued were in violation of the law in general, and he would respond by telling us to disburse the money anyway.”
In response to questions by this investigation, former Minister of Culture Obel says he formed four committees to assess the Fund’s performance in order to save it from its dire condition. Obel was content with his defence of the disbursement of funds to what he called “the talented and creatives”. He considers this a better alternative than for the money going to the “pockets of the Fund's employees”. Regarding the formation of the Fund’s Board of Directors, Obel explained that he contacted Prime Minister Mohammad Salem Basandowa in 2012 to discuss the matter, to no avail.
The former minister attributes the failure in forming a board of directors to the government's preoccupation with complex issues such as the Transitional Justice Law.
Obel, who ascended to the position of Minister due to his role in the Yemen’s Youth Revolution, has made many decision without considering recommendations from the committees he formed, and hence went on to allocate money to cultural activities and not to individuals, according to data gathered by the investigator.
The investigator attempted to contact Minister Al-Ruwaishan by phone, SMS and WhatsApp, to give him an opportunity to respond, but to no avail. It was not at all possible to communicate with Minister Al-Muflihi, and word was that he was abroad.
When Sana'a won the honour of being the Arab Capital of Culture in 2004, hundreds of cultural events were organised and more than 500 books were published. This was possible due to the allocation of a special budget for the occasion and the collaboration of several parties to make it successful. Bar this celebration, the Fund has consistently maintained a trend of wasting resources, and once that year drew to a close, cultural events reverted to the state they were in previously, according to official statistics as well as the attached documents.
Former director of the Yemeni Centre For Musical Heritage, Jaber Ali Ahmad, explains that if it had not been for the efforts of Jean Lambert, the director of the French Centre for Archaeology and Social Sciences in Sana’a, the 2006 UNESCO-implemented project “Song of Sana’a”, that documented the capital’s rich musical heritage, would not have materialised. Ahmad also recalled how the Heritage Fund did not respond to funding requests for a number of cultural events that he had proposed.
The Fund adapts its spending according to the resources it receives during the year. For example, if its budget is 700 million rials ($2,800,000), it spends that amount in the same year. However, in the various cases of increase and decrease in funds, priority is given to running cost expenditures to pay Fund and Ministry employees. This explains the inflation of overtime pay, travel allowances, hospitality and assistance.
In 2007, the Fund's resources dropped to 300 million rials ($1,700,000), which was less than half of its income compared to the previous year which stood at 787 million rials ($4 million). To circumvent this deficit, provisions designed for supporting cultural establishments and their events were transformed to pay for wages and service requirements. Over-expenditure in these categories was estimated at 48.3% and 107.9% respectively. Excess spending also reached 800% in the name of donations and grants from the third budget entry. In 2013, the Fund's revenue increased by 3.8%, most of which was spent in the same year.
In addition to being illegal, these payment do not meet the standards set, as they are disbursed based on nepotism and political loyalty. A secondary level theatre actor, for example, receives an allowance of 60,000 rials ($240) a month in addition to his salary from the Ministry. On the other hand, an unemployed dissident poet is paid 5,000 rials ($20) a month, according to the lists of beneficiaries that also include 39 dead people. In another example, the name of the Egyptian writer Atef Awwad who was buried in Yemen in 2008 after he resided and died there, continued to appear on the payment vouchers of media staff until the end of 2014.
Official and independent statistics have shown that the number and the activities of non-governmental cultural institutions have increased tremendously compared to the government institutions, but government entities continued to receive the lion's share of the “crumbs” that were left over from the annual Fund’s capital. The Fund’s official report shows that in October 2014, 238 institutions benefitted from the Fund’s grants. Of these, 102 NGOs received 30,990,000 rials ($144,000), whereas government agencies in comparison have received 70% of the estimated annual support grants at 100 million rials, which was worth just under half a million dollars at the time.
The annual average of the budgets of the Fund, the Ministry of Culture and its affiliated bodies is estimated to be 3 billion rials ($12 million). These allocations, however, have had no impact in terms of cultural development. The number of projects implemented by the Ministry of Culture during 2003-2008 did not exceed 12 projects, most of which were in the area of buying furniture with a value of 867,755,000 rials ($4,800,000). In contrast, Fund data shows that it disbursed 1,200,000,000 million rials ($6,185,000) in the form of monthly dues to its own and Ministry employees during the same period.
In May 2009, Minister Al-Muflihi and the Governor of Aden, Adnan Al-Jafri, laid the foundation stone for a project to build a cultural complex in the Sheikh Othman area of Aden Governorate. This would cost 1,500,000,000 rials ($7,425,000) and, according to Deputy Minister of Culture, Abdullah Kadada, the project remained an mere empty piece of fenced land.
Director of the Culture Bureau in the Sheikh Othman area Jamal Al-Shawesh asserts that after the outbreak of the Civil War, in 2015, gunmen have managed to seize the land and have built some houses for themselves on it.
UNESCO lists three Yemeni heritage sites as threatened: Zabid, the old City of Sana’a and Shibam Hadhramaut. The United Nations had previously threatened to remove Zabid from the World Heritage List after noticing a lack of protection to the area’s ancient buildings. An investigative report by ARIJ conducted in 2013 warned of systematic attacks on heritage sites in that area.
In 2018, a Houthi-controlled watchdog and accountability agency discovered an embezzlement worth 31 million rials ($124,000) committed by the General Association for the Preservation of Historic Cities in Yemen. The association’s director and staff and the institution financial affairs specialists were accused of being involved in this fraudulent activity between 2009 and 2016.
Corruption extends to most cultural activities, including just two publications: the monthly "Culture" magazine and "Al-Iklil" Quarterly. The Ministry of Finance approved 22 million rials annually (approximately $90,000) for both magazines, and the Fund 12 million ($50,000), yet they were never published regularly.
According to Minister Obel, only one issue of "Al-Iklil" was published in two years an that is only one example. Obel added that he has inherited millions in debts, including some in US dollars to a Lebanese publishing house for printing books to mark Yemen’s celebration of Sanaa as the Arab Capital of Culture in 2004.
The idea of establishing the Fund stems from the 1994 Law on Antiquities, specifically, Article 37 of Law No. 24, imposing fines on antiquity-related crimes that were diverted for the benefit of the "Antiquities Support Fund". This fund was never really established, but it is the theoretical basis for what is now known as the Heritage and Cultural Development Fund. Fund management was supposed to implement concrete projects such as documenting artefacts and equipping museums with surveillance cameras and alarm systems, but it veered towards designating monthly financial allocations to museum guards and staff without legal basis.
In October 2013, employees of Sanaa’s National Museum used the opportunity of the Eid holiday to organise a wedding for a colleague at the museum. The party ended with the theft of seven ancient swords and four manuscripts. The General Director of Protection at the Antiquities Authority, Abdul Karim Al-Burakani, told the investigator that an administrative employee in the Department of Protection of Antiquities was charged for the theft.
"If you do not disburse money to them, they will kill you," Dammaj said, as he highlighted difficulties in any attempts to stop the prevailing pattern of wasting the Fund’s budget.
Corruption does not only hinder development, but it also contributes to the destabilisation of security and stability according to a study by Transparency International entitled Fifth Column. The study, published in 2017, monitored incidents of violence related to corruption in 20 countries, including Yemen between 2008 and 2016. The incidents cover anti-corruption and anti-government demonstrations, the overthrow of regimes and civil wars.
The 1991 Cabinet Law No. 20 stipulates that the Minister take individual responsibility for the operations that occur within the scope of his competence, for the decisions he makes in this area as well as for the plans and policies applied within this sector.
Law No. 39 of 2006 on Combating Corruption, defines corruption as "using a public position to obtain private interests by violating the law, advantage of it, or by taking advantage of the authorities".
The Heritage Fund and the Ministry of Culture provide an example of how corruption works within the financial and administrative apparatus of the country. The Heritage Fund began with a total of six employees who made up the total number of staff members upon its establishment. The administrative system of the Fund was inflated to include more than 130 employees towards the end of 2014. Of those, 17 were associated with the office of the CEO alone, and 11 were guards appointed to service the Chairman.
Embezzlement, whether directly or through a ploy, is considered a grave crime and punishment may reach up to 10 years of imprisonment as per Articles 162 and 163 of the Criminal and Penal Code. Examples include wasting the budget and not spending it in a way that would enhance public interest. Additionally, Article 19 of the Yemeni Constitution considers tampering with public funds “an act of sabotage and aggression against society”.
In addition to the Central Organisation for Control and Auditing and the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption, the ministries of Finance and Civil Service monitor the financial and administrative performance of government agencies. These two ministries are represented by four employees in the Fund, but these “external auditors” facilitated the grave violations of the Fund, as documents reveal. Disbursements are prepared in the presence of accounts and personnel managers who are representatives from the ministries of Finance and Civil Service, and they only become effective after their signatures.
The Central Organisation for Control and Auditing, the House of Representatives and the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption share the task of monitoring the performance of the government apparatus. The government allocates an annual budget of 14 billion rials ($62 million) for these three agencies, but this oversight remains a formality.
The Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption did not only turn a blind eye to corruption inherent in the Fund, but was also actively involved in polishing its image through what was called a “Cultural Alliance”. This is a memorandum signed by the two parties in February 2016 to launch a campaign in 2017 to raise awareness among schoolchildren in Sana’a to warn against the dangers of corruption.
When asked about the reason for her agency's involvement in Fund activity instead of opening an investigation into its corruption, the head of the Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption, Judge Afrah Badwylan said: "The Authority holds such activities with several parties regardless of the existence of corruption." The investigator emailed the management of the Central Organisation for Control and Auditing, requesting copies of the organisation’s reports on the special funds. The investigator also met with Qais Nasser, the media official in the organisation that is currently under Houthi control, but neither one of the officials answered our request.
Abdel-Maez Dabwan, a member of the Media and Culture Committee in the House of Representatives, explained that the ruling and hegemony of the General People's Congress Party over the House of Representatives made the parliamentary majority subject to the moods and whims of an individual or a party. He added: "Therefore, it is natural for the representatives’ recommendations on corruption cases to be suspended because the director of the legislative and executive branches is the same person."
The documents do not show details of what the Minister gets from the Fund. Dammaj, however, confirms to the investigator that an amount of 320,000 rials per month ($1,500) is paid in the form of dues and petty cash. This is in addition to $1,200 per month for the rent of the Minister's residence. It is worth noting that the General Secretariat of the Cabinet gives members of the government various perks, including rent and payment for attending sessions, as shown by the data.
World Bank indicators on the quality of governance in the Middle East show that Yemen suffers from widespread political and administrative corruption, both on large and small scale. The United Nations estimates the wealth of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh to be between 32 and 60 billion US dollars, and this is seen as an example of the persistence of corruption and the failure of the mechanisms that try to combat it.
Between 2005 and 2007, only 165 employees out of one million civil and military employees were convicted of corruption crimes. According to a World Bank document (PIDA2529) dated December 5, 2013, no administrative measures were taken against them in the relevant ministries, including the Ministry of Civil Service.
The Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption referred only 71 cases to prosecution out of a total of 2,400 complaints received between 2007 and 2014.
Since 2007, the Cabinet and the House of Representatives have issued decisions and recommendations that emphasise the structuring of private funds, the formation of boards of directors, and the prevention of spending their budget on the ministries' offices. However, to date, none of these decisions have been implemented.
*All parenthesised exchange rates are in US dollars and are approximations that may differ slightly depending on time of exchange.