Coordinated Digital Campaigns Target Dissidents and Activists in Syria

Nardin Al-Rawi (pseudonym) and Sami Sabir
+8,000accounts we tracked
+40accounts and pages whose engagement data we analyzed
3 cases of targeting we documented
+1,300 interactions on a single post

This investigation tracks online campaigns waged against dissenting voices and female journalists and activists in Syria during 2025 and 2026. We conclude that some of these campaigns originated from a WhatsApp group co-managed by officials in the Ministry of Information, and that a network of low-activity Facebook accounts worked in concert to boost engagement with the campaigns’ content and widen its reach, while hiding who was behind them Over several months, we tracked more than 8,000 accounts that had published or amplified content linked to the campaigns we were investigating.
We reviewed chat logs and messages obtained from closed groups and analyzed engagement data across dozens of posts and pages. We also interviewed both those targeted by these campaigns and experts on digital safety.

On April 17, 2026, dozens of civilians, including workers and activists, gathered in Yusuf al-Azma Square in Damascus in response to a call by the “Law and Dignity” initiative, demanding action to address deteriorating living standards and the rising cost of living, and calling for the protection of individual freedoms and respect for the rule of law.

The protest did not stay peaceful for long, as it was met by a counter-rally and the situation then escalated into clashes. Torn banners and injured protesters told the story of what had happened, and the protesters were labeled “remnants of the regime.”

But what happened in the square was not the starting point. Days before people gathered there, another battle was being fought online. Messages and conversations that we obtained show that mobilization campaigns had been launched from a WhatsApp group co-managed by officials in the Ministry of Information. Supporters were recruited, and narratives and messages were drafted and subsequently shared on social media platforms before these found their way onto the streets. These conversations show that officials at the information ministry coordinated with journalists, two days before the sit-in took place, to mobilize public opinion against it.

The starting gun

The trigger for the campaign was a message posted in the group by journalist Alaa al-Ahmad, which included the hashtag #The_We_Want_to_Live_Sit-in_Does_Not_Represent_Me. Within seconds, messages supporting the hashtag began proliferating in the WhatsApp group.

Group members were then instructed to draft a statement in the name of “Journalists and Activists of Rural Damascus,” disavowing the sit-in and publicly condemning it, and to circulate it widely across various pages and platforms.

Chat logs show that the campaign went beyond exchanging views or positions and involved coordination over messaging, content and how to spread it. By tracing these records, we identified several people who played pivotal roles in managing the campaign and promoting its narrative: Yusuf Abu Daqa (al-Bustani), director of the Damascus Countryside Media Directorate; Fadi Shabbat, head of the Digital Media Department at the Damascus Countryside Media Directorate; and journalist Alaa al-Ahmad. The messages show they discussed content related to the sit-in and decided how it should be published and circulated.

In response to our questions, Fadi Shabbat, head of the Digital Media Department at the Damascus Countryside Media Directorate, said his department’s role was “limited” to highlighting development and public-service initiatives in the governorate. He added: “Shaping public opinion is absolutely not in our remit, since we have no mandate or administrative instructions from the Ministry of Information to do so.”

Shabbat denied that his department owned or managed “any fake or pseudonymous accounts,” or that it had “any administrative or organizational link” to the sit-in. He admitted expressing “personal opinions” in WhatsApp groups and on social media platforms, but said it was his “natural right” as a Syrian citizen.

Screenshots of a conversation in the private chat group of the Damascus Countryside Media Directorate show coordination to circulateg the directorate’s draft statement opposing the Apri 17 sit-in
Screenshots of a conversation in the private chat group of the Damascus Countryside Media Directorate show coordination to circulateg the directorate’s draft statement opposing the Apri 17 sit-in.
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From closed group to public pages

Within hours, dozens of pages and accounts began reposting and circulating the statement, apparently following instructions from the WhatsApp group. The statement then moved from this closed space to a broader network of interactive pages and accounts. At the same time, we identified a different version of the same statement circulating under the name “Revolution Coordination Committees”. This version was not simply a rejection of the sit-in, but also described participants in hostile terms. They were called “remnants of the old regime,”accused of being “agents of Iran” and labeled “Assad’s dogs.” This language framed those who took part in the sit-in as political adversaries or enemies, rather than citizens exercising their right to freedom of expression.



Analyzing the network

When we analyzed engagement data from more than 40 accounts and news pages that had shared the two anti-sit-in statements on April 15 and 16, we identified a recurring pattern of accounts that showed no signs of normal use. Some used generic images or images taken from the internet. There were accounts with no profile picture or visible posts; accounts with only one to five friends; and accounts bearing generic or pseudonymous names, such as “سوري وأفتخر.”

Pages and accounts that reposted the statement

Each dot represents \ a page or account that reposted the statement from the Damascus Countryside Media Directorate.

صفحات وحسابات أعادت تداول بيان مديرية إعلام ريف دمشق Sliman T Alrouh ليندا حنا محمد غالب يوسف ليلا المليحة مباشر خواطر الزبداني ضاحية يوسف العظمة أشرفية صحنايا اليوم مركز ريف دمشق الإعلامي تنسيقية حي التضامن الدمشقي تنسيقية الثورة السورية في جيرود قناة جيرود الفيسبوكية - Jairoud.TV قناة القلمون الأخبارية مدينة حرستا - Harasta City الدمشقي نور الخطيب حي القدم الدمشقي يوميات بيت سحم القلمون الآن Mohammad Hammoud مضايا madaya سوريا الان سبينة الآن مضايا الآن جيرود للكل Yaman Bassam Aljabi الرحيبة الآن ايجابي مع فؤاد ضاحية حرستا الآن ملتقى أهالي حمورية شبكة سبينة الإخبارية أهالي الخيارة عيلة وحدة تنسيقية الثورة السورية في عرطوز وسيم القادري أبوصطيف النبكي مجلة حرستا الالكترونية بيت تيما - ربوع سوريا جديدة عرطوز البلد اخبار دمشق الان جيرود نبض قلبي جيرود الحدث Hajar Fz Omar Adib قصي علي The statement from the Damascus Countryside Media Directorate

Drag the drawing horizontally to read the names

One example account

The same account also appeared repeatedly alongside a group of similar low-activity ones in previous digital campaigns attacking dissidents and female journalists. This suggests a recurring pattern of use that goes beyond the normal, spontaneous activity on the platform.

Alaa Al-Ahmad's post and accounts with few friends that interacted with it

A sample of accounts interacting with posts opposing the April 17 sit-in. It shows the account “سوري وأفتخر” alongside a group of similar accounts with limited activity.

Jdeidet Artouz Al-Balad's post and accounts with few friends that interacted with it

A sample of accounts interacting with posts opposing the April 17 sit-in. It shows the account “سوري وأفتخر” alongside a group of similar accounts with limited activity.

Tracking this online behavior revealed an interconnected network operating on two levels: central accounts that generate and disseminate content, and a second tier of accounts whose job is to amplify engagement and create the impression of popular support that may not reflect reality.

Fadi Shabbat, head of the Digital Media Department within the Rural Damascus Media Directorate, denied that his department owned or managed any fake accounts.

A two-tiered network

The "red" dots are central accounts that serve as the source of content. The "card" accounts—which are fake, engagement-driven profiles with a limited number of friends—connect to these central accounts and amplify their reach.

  • central accounts
  • fake accounts
شبكة المحرر الإخبارية نيوز أخبار الحولة بدقيقة تلفزيون حمص أحمد العقدة Maher Kassab منار حمشو Ahmed El Yasin علاء الأحمد Mohammed Z Rateb Jorui Al-Ali Njomi NJ Taym Mo Abdulkarim Idris هه هه عبد رحمن
ابو محمد2 friends
Abdulkarim Saad1 friend
سوري وأفتخر1 friend
Log log (Alnasser)@log.log.405114 · 10 friends
BaRa'a3 friends
Ag Ag5 friends
Reem Ali1 friend
Alkink Ahmad3 friends
Hosain Ali (W)3 friends

Drag the drawing horizontally to read the names

This technical infrastructure was about more than numbers and account IDs. Our investigation shows that in three cases, it went on to impact the lives of real people.

From a call for an investigation to a court case

Hiba Ezzedine al-Hajji, chief executive of the organization Equity and Empowerment, has long been known for her work in Idlib on women’s empowerment and gender justice.

On the evening of April 19, 2025, she wrote on Facebook that she had come across a girl suspected of being one of those abducted during the events on the Syrian coast. Hiba said she posted the statement after her attempts to contact official agencies failed, prompting her to call on the authorities to launch a serious investigation into the case.

But her post was not taken as an appeal to look into a serious allegation. The online discussion soon shifted from asking about the girl’s fate and the accuracy of the information to focusing on the author of the post herself. Any discussion of abuses committed during the events on the coast remains a highly sensitive topic, often met with skepticism or denial.

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Distorting content

It did not take long for the content of the post to become distorted. Instead of the focus being on Hiba’s call to investigate what had happened to a girl suspected of having been abducted, her post was presented to the public as though she were alleging the existence of a “market in female captives” in Idlib.

In less than 24 hours, a network of news pages and accounts presented a single narrative—claiming that Hiba had published a post “alleging that there was a market for female captives in Idlib.” This description was repeated in similar terms across dozens of posts.

However, a check of the original post against verified screenshots and verification of its content showed that these allegations did not reflect what the post actually said. It made no mention of a “market in female captives” or any of the allegations later leveled against her. In fact, it focused on calling on the authorities to investigate the fate of a young woman suspected of being among those abducted.

While the initial reaction to Hiba’s post on social media appeared spontaneous, data analysis revealed a different picture: signs of a coordinated digital campaign against her across several platforms, particularly Facebook and Telegram, which sought to reframe the issue and shift the discussion from the substance of the allegations to the author of the post.

This campaign was led by a network of accounts and pages, both inside Syria and abroad, which promote the new Syrian government using tactics such as “coordinated inauthentic behavior” and “fake engagement” on Facebook.

Hiba stood by her story and, in a second post, revealed that an interior ministry official had contacted her, obtained all the details of the case, and promised to follow up on it personally. This did nothing to slow the momentum of the campaign, however, and the accounts and pages involved stepped up their attacks. Monitoring of the content in circulation showed that false claims about what Hiba had written continued to spread, along with audio recordings linked to the case, parts of which had been deleted or presented out of context.

The Syrian authorities denied these details, saying they had no knowledge of Hiba’s case and had not dealt with it.

A three-hour timeline

  1. Before 8:00 pm

    Hiba Ezzedine al-Hajji’s original Facebook post
    Hiba Ezzedine al-Hajji’s original Facebook post - April 19, 2025
  2. After 8:00 pm: (approximate time based on when other accounts shared the screenshot, as the original post was deleted).

    A post attributed to journalist Qutaiba Yassin, April 19, 2025
    A post attributed to journalist Qutaiba Yassin, April 19, 2025
  3. 9:00 pm the Homs TV Facebook page posts a photo of Hiba Ezzedine, along with a false claim. The page then widens its attack on Hiba, saying “she has a center in Idlib to support and empower women,” and attaching an audio clip that claims she “is fighting against the hijab and preventing women who wear it from coming to the centre.”

    Post by the “Homs TV” Facebook page, April 19, 2025
    Post by the “Homs TV” Facebook page, April 19, 2025

    In the comments section is a post attributed to the Syrian journalist Qutaiba Yassin, in which he claims to have seen leaked emails showing she worked as an informant for the ousted Assad regime.

  4. Nine minutes later, the page posts a video containing an audio recording supposedly of Hiba, with comments describing her as a liar. The video is immediately reposted by a network of Syrian news pages.

  5. 10:44 pm: accounts circulate a video with a screen recording of a conversation, showing that the audio clips had been forwarded several times on WhatsApp, with a message saying that “the first recording has been shared on websites, but the rest are still to come.” In other words, what was posted was the first batch of recordings. Other accounts later claimed there were leaks confirming Hiba had been working for the regime.

  6. Less than three hours later, the page carries “breaking news” that the governor of Idlib, Mohammad Abdul Rahman, had ordered legal action against Hiba Ezzedine al-Hajji, following the circulation of audio clips attributed to her that “attacked the hijab.”

  7. The following day, the police, acting on instructions from the Political Affairs Department, close down the Equity and Empowerment organization in Kafr Yahmul, “for its own protection,” according to Hiba.

Network of accounts involved in the campaign against Hiba Ezzedine

Hover the cursor over the contact point, or click it, to view account profile data.

  • Account included in the sample
  • Connection node
  • Account whose profile can be viewed
Sample account clusters are connected via a single path

Drag the drawing horizontally to read the grid.

Click on a highlighted point to view account file data.

Source: Analysis of the network of accounts involved in the campaign against Hiba Ezzedine. The clusters consist of accounts with limited activity; the red nodes are connections between them, not central pages such as “Homs TV”.

From the campaign to the Political Security Branch

Noor Suleiman is an activist and member of the Syrian Democratic Alliance. On July 26, 2025, she was arrested at the Political Security Branch in the Mezzeh district of Damascus.

She was arrested after a widespread online campaign against her, following an angry message she posted on Facebook, which she later deleted and apologized for. After her home was raided twice and her father was arrested, she was asked to go to the security branch to delete a video she had shot during the first raid to document abuses. As soon as she arrived with her mother, she was detained without charge for three days.

In a room that Noor recognized, having been there before the fall of the Assad regime, she sat across from an interrogator who was no more than thirty. The questioning was not directly about the post that had provoked the campaign against her, but about “spreading false news” and “the abducted women.”

“I tried to explain that I was an opposition activist, but the accusations had all been prepared in advance:: ‘You’re an agent, you’re an Alawite, you’re talking about the abducted women.’ They lumped everything under sectarian incitement.”

Noor Suleiman

Minister of Information Hamza Mustafa intervened to secure her release, following pressure from other activists. The chief public prosecutor for Damascus, Judge Hossam Khattab, said on July 31 that she was released because the procedures used to summon Noor were unlawful. But he added that her release would not affect the ongoing legal case against her on charges of “sectarian incitement and spreading hatred.” This prompted Noor to leave the country.

In its response to our questions, the information ministry acknowledged that the first arrest “had been made without a warrant or authorization from the proper judicial authority.” Ziad Dioub, a lawyer and director of the ministry’s Legal Affairs Directorate, said the minister had intervened to secure Noor’s release because “she had been detained without legal basis” and in order to “rectify procedural errors and safeguard the freedom of the press and journalists.”

He added that the subsequent arrest warrant (No. 3287), “which met the legal requirements,” had been issued by the Fifth Investigating Judge in Damascus, and that Noor “was re-arrested on the basis of this warrant,” which he said was “a new and legally separate procedure.”

How the arrest was covered online

It is worth examining how the arrest—which the public prosecutor and the information ministry itself described as unlawful—was reported.

At 7:22 pm on Tuesday, July 29, 2025, an account verified with a blue check mark, under the name “Manar Hamshou,” reported that “Noor Suleiman, who once said ‘The shoe of an Alawite is above the most powerful man in the country,’ has been arrested.” The post also incited her torture and justified abuses in detention.

By March 8, 2026, the post received more than 1,300 interactions, broken down as follows:

“Blue” likes 74.03% Sarcastic comments 22.83%

Among those interacting with this post, we identified a group of “fake” accounts that had also helped inflate engagement with posts targeting other people These included “سوري وأفتخر”, which we also identified as part of the April campaign.

The “Ziad al-Khalidi” account

We detected repeated participation in incitement campaigns by more than 40 accounts, most of which had only one friend or none at all and showed no normal activity. One account that stood out was called “Ziad al-Khalidi,” and we found that it appeared in at least three posts.

Two posts on April 29 and 30, 2025:

One of the posts carried allegations that “Noor Suleiman maintains contact with a large number of Syrian revolutionaries abroad, to gather information about them and hand it to the National Security Bureau and the Political Security Branch.” The second post alleged she had links with senior officers in the former Assad regime, while another dealt with Minister of Information Hamza Mustafa and his links with Noor Suleiman. A page named “Daraa Airport Diaries” also appeared.

Post on December 11:

The same account appeared in a satirical post on the “Daraa Airport Diaries” page - which has more than 224,000 followers—as part of a campaign against female activist Farah Youssef.

We identified at least three posts in which the Ziad al-Khalidi account appeared

April 29 2025
April 302025
December 11 Farah Youssef
+224,000 number of followers of the Daraa Airport Diaries page
Ziad Al-Khalidi's account among the interactions on Maher Qassab's post about Nour Suleiman

A sample of accounts interacting with posts as part of an online campaign following the arrest of Noor Suleiman. The Ziad al-Khalidi account appears alongside the سوري وأفتخر of It account as well as a group of similar accounts with limited activity.

Ziad Al-Khalidi's account among the interactions on Maher Qassab's post about Nour Suleiman

A sample of accounts interacting with posts as part of an online campaign following the arrest of Noor Suleiman. The Ziad al-Khalidi account appears alongside the سوري وأفتخر of It account as well as a group of similar accounts with limited activity.

Ziad Al-Khalidi's account among the interactions on Maher Qassab's post about Nour Suleiman

A sample of accounts interacting with posts as part of an online campaign following the arrest of Noor Suleiman. The Ziad al-Khalidi account appears alongside the سوري وأفتخر of It account as well as a group of similar accounts with limited activity.

Fabricated conversations and the complaint process

Alaa Amer, a journalist based in Istanbul, faced another form of digital violence. Fabricated conversations purportedly between her and a young woman named “Zainab” were posted in an attempt to damage her reputation by portraying her as encouraging the “seduction of Public Security officers.”

Alaa filed a formal complaint together with the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression which helps journalists in their dealings with the information ministry. . She later discovered, from friends inside the ministry, that the incitement against her came directly from official WhatsApp groups affiliated with the ministry.

Alaa confronted the ministry with this evidence on the program “Wast al-Balad” hosted by Zaidoun al-Zoubi, with Omar Hajj Ahmad present. The ministry gave no clear answers, saying only that those close to power “are held to greater accountability.”

What the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression said

We contacted the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, which had monitored a number of these cases, and asked whether it always followed the same procedure and how the authorities dealt with such complaints. This was its response:

“Each case is handled according to its specific circumstances, and referral to the authorities is not a standard procedure. It depends on several factors, including the wishes of the journalist bringing the complaint, the nature of the abuse, and whether official intervention would be worthwhile.”

Regarding Alaa’s case specifically, the Center added:

“In Alaa’s case – given that her situation was being discussed in WhatsApp groups of media professionals in Syria – the matter was brought to the Ministry of Information. A complaint was filed through the official channels, using the ministry’s link for submitting such complaints. One available option was to follow this up with the ministry, which was done, but this was not the only course of action.”

What should we call this phenomenon?

Are we witnessing a new pattern emerging, or is this an extension of …older mechanisms adapting to a new context without losing their structure?

To answer this, we turned to Alaa Ghazal, a technical expert working in digital safety and information security. Before December 2024, he monitored online campaigns and how they took shape and spread. Some were run through semi-organized groups Telegram and other platforms, and others through wider networks that defamed or blackmailed individuals – particularly women - or used fake content against them.

Ghazal says that the idea of online campaigns “is not a new phenomenon, but an extension of methods of influence and mobilization that predate the internet. But they began to take their current shape with the spread of the internet and online forums in the early 2000s.”

He adds: “In Syria, these campaigns emerged on a large scale as social media spread, especially with the outbreak of the revolution in 2011. You could say that much of the activity in Syria on platforms like Facebook and Twitter at that time was more like an open online campaign aimed at mobilizing people, reporting on events, and documenting them.”

These campaigns have now become more professional, he says, in planning, content management, assigning roles and measuring impact.

Why women in particular?

In the three cases we have documented in this investigation, it was not just what the women said that came under attack. In the case of Hiba Ezzedine, attacks shifted from the content of her post to her personal image and her presence as a woman. Her image was a central element of the content in circulation, not a side issue.

An earlier study on digital violence shows that this type of targeting is widespread and directed against women, most of whom have experienced it in some form, mostly defamation, harassment and blackmail. The same study concludes that such behavior is not confined to the internet and sometimes amounts to real-world threats and dangers, amid a lack of effective legal protection and social environments that perpetuate this violence.

“Alongside the sectarian dimension and accusations that I was a traitor and an agent, I was also clearly targeted because I am a woman. They tried to use labels such as ‘feminist’ or ‘activist’ as accusations in themselves, and they tried to link my public activism to my personal life in a degrading way, not to mention the obscene language I was subjected to.”

Noor Suleiman

As for how it affected her, Noor says: “To be honest, at first I felt overwhelmed and furious at the scale of the injustice and defamation I was subjected to, especially as these were grave accusations that could have affected my reputation and personal safety.. There was no evidence- just people sitting with their phones writing whatever they wanted.”

* pseudonym

This investigation was produced in partnership between ARIJ and Women Who Won the War.

This investigation was published in Arabic on the following: